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In the days following Hurricane Katrina, the media portrayed the people inside 
New Orleans as a threat rather than a population in need. It was looters, in particular, who 
were portrayed in this deviant light and they were well publicized in the media coverage 
in Katrina’s aftermath. However, sociological research is limited in terms of examining 
looting, especially in the wake of a disaster. This research explores how looters were 
socially constructed after Hurricane Katrina within three prominent US newspapers: The 
New York Times, The Washington Post and Chicago Tribune.  
This research addresses three questions.  First, how have Hurricane Katrina
looters been framed by the news media?  Second, how have Hurricane Katrina looters 
been differentially framed by these three powerful continuum of voices? Lastly, were 
media frames of perceived Katrina looters instrumental in re-establishing social order? 
Based on a frame analysis of newspaper articles in The New York Times, The 
Washington Post and Chicago Tribune, four primary looting frames emerged: property 
crime, lawlessness, policing, and race. The extracted looting frames provide insight into 
how the media portrayed those who looted after Hurricane Katrina. The unfolding of the 
analysis told a unique sociological story by bringing the New Orleans lootert  life.  
The underlying idea of the looter after Katrina took on an ill-famed or villainous 
tone. According to media reports, looters vandalized, ran wild among the city and 
required “tough policing” in order to contain their behavior. It was the media that served 
as a social force that helped create and move these ideas about looting.
The portrayal of the looter in this light becomes of great importance in the 
moment after a disaster takes place: the moment in which society realizes that utter chaos 
has replaced the normal social order. It is at this time when people pull together and set 
aside their differences. However, this warm and fuzzy feeling of wanting to pull together 
as one does not sustain itself for long. After Katrina, it was the claims of looting that 
broke this romanticized feeling of social justice for all. Looting rumors at this time 
contribute to the re-establishment of social order or in another way, bring back old 
societal order. This is accomplished because looters are a way of establishing us (the 
good guys) and them (the bad guys) once again in a time in which all social order is for a
moment lost. In other words, singling out the looter becomes a way to make sense of the 
chaos; brings back stratification; brings back something that is familiar and m ybe even 
comforting to those that hold more power in society. Claims of looting were powerful in 
this way because it was based on the age old struggle between the “haves” and “have-
nots.”  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Disasters seem to fascinate the American public. Newspapers dedicate a 
substantial amount of space to them and numerous books have been written on the 
subject (Platt, 1999; Bates and Swan, 2007 and Brunsma, Overfelt and Picou, 2007). 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is an example of a disaster that created such media frenzy. The 
research presented here considers how the looter was framed in New Orleans aft r 
Hurricane Katrina. By employing frame analysis I analyzed newspaper articles to 
uncover how the “looter” in this particular disaster was portrayed by the news mdia.   
Hurricane Katrina’s effect on New Orleans was catastrophic. It was one of the 
deadliest natural disasters in American history.  On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina 
made landfall. Approximately eighty percent of the metropolitan area was flooded, with 
some parts of the city under twenty to thirty feet of water (Knauer, 2005). The flooding of 
the city was the direct result of a powerful storm surge (CNN News, 2005).  The storm 
surge breached the levees, which were protecting New Orleans in numerous places. 
Strong easterly winds pushed water into Lake Pontchartrain, creating the lake water to 
rise (CNN News, 2005).  In the end, the city of New Orleans had merged with Lake 
Pontchartrain, leaving most of the city submerged in water. (Knauer, 2005).   
In the days to follow, media broadcasts of the disaster began to hit the air.  They 
showed images of flooded streets, blown-out office windows, ruined homes, images of 
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victims being rescued from rooftops and people searching for their lost loved ones (see 
Fox News and CNN broadcasts from August 29, 2005 to August 31, 2005).  The media 
also showed an endless number of individuals carrying stolen goods through the streets of 
New Orleans.  These individuals have come to be known as “looters,” and they have been 
well publicized in the media coverage in Katrina’s aftermath.   
 Soon after the hurricane made its way out of New Orleans, broadcasts began to 
circulate that some residents and even police officers were looting stores (Fisher, 2005). 
As reported by David Fisher (2005), resident looters included gangs of armed gunmen, 
and gunfire was heard in parts of the city. The Sixth District of New Orleans w s hit hard 
by looters. Much of the looting was confined to the lower-income neighborhoods (Dwyer 
and Drew, 2005). Kathleen Blanco, the Governor of New Orleans, warned the looters and 
the general public that the National Guard had been sent in to reinforce the laws and they 
had M-16s loaded and ready to fire if needed. The guardsmen were given specific orders 
to restore civic orders with a shoot-to-kill policy (BBC, 2005).   
 In the days following Hurricane Katrina, the media portrayed the people insid  
New Orleans as a threat rather than as a population in need.  It was looters, in pa ticular, 
who were portrayed in this deviant light. However, the instances of looting that took 
place during and after Hurricane Katrina are very unusual.  Looting only happens 
occasionally and because it is such a rare phenomenon, the average person will never 
come into direct contact with looters or the act of looting. As a result, most people must 
turn to other sources for information on what looting entails and who looters are. One of 
these top sources includes the news media.  Since the news media is the main source of
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information on looters, this research project examined newspaper articles dealing with the 
disaster of Hurricane Katrina. Newspapers played a significant role in constructing the 
problem of looting within the days following Hurricane Katrina. It is important to 
examine media portrayals of looters during Hurricane Katrina because these media 
constructions have very likely fashioned collective sentiment and led to collective ideas 
about looters and their affects on society. 
 In this thesis, I analyzed the social construction of “looters” during disaster .  
Employing frame analysis I analyzed newspaper articles to uncover h w the “looter” was 
portrayed by the media.  I have chosen The New York Times, The Washington Post and 
the Chicago Tribune due to their distinguished and established reputation of being well 
respected and prominent American newspapers. By examining Hurricane Katrina a more 
lucid and comprehensive understanding of the “looter” as a category of person, as 
constructed through the media, can be established.   
 Tierney, Bevc and Kuligowski (2006) point out the analyses on data collected in 
Katrina’s aftermath are still ongoing.  The research community, the media, an  the nation 
as a whole still do not know with any degree of certainty what actually did occurin the 
days following Hurricane Katrina.  In an effort to understand the social implications of 
Hurricane Katrina, the images produced by the media during and after the disast r can 
provide vital data in this endeavor. 
  The questions I sought to answer were threefold: First, how have looters in 
Hurricane Katrina been framed by the news media?  Second, how have looters in 
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Hurricane Katrina been differentially framed by these three powerful continuum of 
voices? And third, were media frames of perceived Katrina looters instrumental in 
re-establishing social order?"  
Based on a frame analysis of The New York Times, The Washington Post and 
Chicago Tribune, four primary looting frames emerged; property crime, lawlessness 
policing, and race. Furthermore, the time directly following the hurricane when
devastation and desperation in the city was at its highest; when for the most part, only the 
poverty stricken population, rescue workers and various government officials had access 
to the city; the point in time in which looters were put under a lens and made front page 
news all across America played an extremely important role in the analysis.  
Prior to analysis of the data I first reviewed the existing literature on disasters and 
looting and the media as it relates to Hurricane Katrina which is detailed in Chapter two.  
In Chapter three I discuss the methodology employed in this research. In the remaining 
chapters I present the results of my qualitative analysis and discuss these findings in 
greater detail.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
                                 
 
Disaster research, for the most part, has been devoted to small scale events. 
Examples include Cordova, Three Mile Island and Buffalo Creek. Smaller scale events 
are easier to grasp and researchers are more inclined to see and understand the whole 
disaster (Erikson, 2007 as cited in Brunsma, Overfelt and Picou, 2007: xvii). However, 
Katrina has left the research community with a much different feeling. The impact that 
Hurricane Katrina has left in its wake is immeasurable (Erikson, 2007 as cited in 
Brunsma et al., 2007: xvii). Kai Erikson (2007) reminds us that in order for us to begin 
the process of understanding the story of Katrina we must “come at it with different 
vantage points” (cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: xviii).The vantage point of this research 
uncovered how the media constructed looters in the days that followed the hurricane. 
To aid in the understanding of the social construction of the looter after disasters, 
an appropriate review of the literature must be conducted. For this research project three 
areas of literature become central to understanding disasters. These area  include an 
overview of previous disaster research, looting literature, and other studies that have been 
conducted on Katrina that closely related to this research.    
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Disaster Research 
Katrina has proven to be the most destructive disaster of our time when 
considering how much harm it did, and it has proven to be the most enlight ing disaster 
when considering all the knowledge that can be gained from it (Erikson, 2007 as cited in 
Brunsma et al., 2007: xviii).  However, before we can analyze whatcan be gained we 
must consider what has already been found. Exploration of existing disaster research can 
help us to situate or guide all the complexities of Katrina. In the section to follow I will 
explore the definitions and types of disaster. My aim here is to provide a starting point, a 
place to situate Katrina so that further, more complex analyses can grow.   
Defining Disaster  
 Early disaster research definitions were generally left incomplete (Perry, 2007). In 
1932 L.J. Carr acknowledged a disaster as a product of its consequences, arguing that if 
the walls withstand the earthquake and the dam retains water, there is no disaster. Here 
Carr looks at disaster as the “collapse of the cultural protectins” (Carr, 1932: 211 as 
cited in Perry, 2007: 4). The definition of disaster is situated within events of the natural 
environment, technical incidents and wartime incidents that generat significant negative 
consequences (Dombrowksky, 1981 as cited in Perry, 2007: 4). The approach of looking 
at disasters as primarily negative in consequence can still be found in research today even 
though early work in the field distinguished disasters from other ev nts (such as civil 
disturbances) associated with negative consequences (Barton 1963; Quarantelli, 1966; 
Warheit, 1972 as cited in Perry, 2007: 4). Quarantelli (1982) was among the first scholars 
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to challenge the defining of disasters by surface characteristics of the agent (cited in 
Perry, 2007: 4). Charles E. Fritz in the 1960’s proposed a formal social s ientific 
definition of disasters (Perry, 2007). These definitions were followed by Barton’s seminal 
examinations of disasters and creation of a typology in 1963 (Perry, 2007). 
  Using the examples above, Perry (2007) argues that when someone proposes a 
definition of disaster, they do not start from scratch. They are influenced by those that set 
out before them. Definitions, in large part are the product of an inductive process (Perry, 
2007). Thus, in creating a definition you must look backwards to gather research (Perry, 
2007).  
Last, Perry (2007) argues that definitions of disasters often emerg  as complex 
and elaborate because those that conduct research do not make their caus , consequences 
and characteristics of the event they are investigating clear (P r y, 2007). Stallings (2005) 
points out that definitions are not intended to be a collection of informal statements (cited 
in Perry, 2007; 4). Similarly, Quarantelli (2005) argues that resea ch rs must separate the 
conditions, characteristics and consequences of disasters when developing definitions 
(cited in Perry, 2007: 4). 
 Moreover, Quarantelli (1987) has argued that there is little basis in logic in 
devising a single definition of disaster that is universally accepted and useful (cited in 
Perry, 2007: 2). With that in mind, disaster can have many different defi itions to many 
different people and the description can serve many different purposes. Thus, there will 
be many different definitions of disaster. What becomes important in defining a 
definition is the audience in which you are speaking to. Quarentelli (2005) further 
 8
explains that when defining disasters sociologists need to devote attention to the 
sociological context (cited in Perry, 2007: 2).  
Types of Disaster 
J. Steven Picou and Brent K. Marshall (2007) discuss the four original types of 
disaster and then discuss a fifth identified as “worse-case” disasters that emerged from 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (cited in Brunsma et al., 2007). The four categories of 
disaster that existed previously include natural, technological, natural-technological and 
terrorism (Picou and Marshall, 2007 as cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 4). All four types 
are seen as separate from one another.  
In the past, disaster researchers, government agencies, the legal system and 
emergency management responders have all acknowledged that disasters c n be either 
natural or technological (Cuthberston and Nigg, 1987 as cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 4). 
Since the late 1940’s social researchers have documented that natural disasters 
(hurricanes, floods and earthquakes) are severe, life-treating events that destroy 
customized environments (Fritz, 1961 as cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 4). Natural 
disasters hold a political and societal consensus that a disaster took place, victims were 
involved and federal, state, and local government agencies as well as volunteer 
organization should automatically support with recovery, restoration and rescue efforts 
(Dynes, 1998; Picou, Marshall, and Gill, 2004 as cited in Brunsma et al., 2007:4). 
Disruptive social consequences are usually short lived and the recovery is considered to 
be therapeutic (Barton, 1969 as cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 4). The outcome of the 
therapeutic community consists of a quick recovery, and usually there are vast 
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improvements in the construction of the modified environment (Drabek, 1986; Mileti, 
Drabek, and Haas, 1975 as cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 4). 
Technological disasters take on a different shape. Technological disasters are 
considered to be toxic events created by humans. They involve the breakdown of 
technology and as a result end up impacting vulnerable human populations (Couch and 
Kroll-Smith, 1985 as cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 4). While the modified environment 
usually remains intact the biophysical environment is severely damaged and even 
uninhabitable. An example of this would be Chernobyl (Picou and Marshall, 2007: 4). 
Ecological systems can also be contaminated to the point that cultural and socioeconomic 
damage is irreparable. An example of this would include the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
(Picou and Marshall, 2007: 4).  Technical failure on a massive scaleand an enormous 
amount of contamination of the biophysical environment set the stage for a devastating 
and difficult process for victims and their families for many years, if not decades (Baum 
and Fleming, 1993; Edelstein, 1988; Erikson, 1994; Freudenburg, 1997; Gill and Picou, 
1991; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1993; Picou and Gill, 2000; Picou and Rosebrook, 1993 as 
cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 4). Technological disasters produce six outcomes. First, 
they produce a contested discourse regarding who was responsible; second, a hronic 
social disruption, anger, mental health problems, and the loss of resourc fo  victims; 
third, delayed restoration and recovery from impacted communities; forth, harm and 
ambiguity; fifth, sociocultural disruption; and last, litigation stre s (Freudenburg, 1993, 
1997, 2000; Marshall, Picou, and Schlichtmann, 2004; Picou, Marshall and Gill, 2004 as 
cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 5). 
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The third type of disaster is natural-technical or “na-tech” disaster. Picou and 
Marshall (2006) suggest that Hurricane Katrina could be conceptualized as a n -tech 
disaster. As a natural disaster, Katrina was an extremely powerful hurricane that 
destroyed a large area along the Gulf Coast. As a technical disaster, Katrina was an event 
that created a large amount of contamination. In a na-tech disaster,  natural disaster 
directly or indirectly releases hazardous material into the environment (Showalter and 
Myers, 1994 as cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 5). Young et. al (2004) note that hazardous 
materials releases can result directly from a natural disaster (dioxin from forest fires) or 
indirectly from unintentional disruptions like Katrina’s impact on oil refineries or through 
purposeful recoveries like pumping polluted water into Lake Pontchartrain (cited in 
Brunsma et al., 2007: 6). Hazardous materials resulting from Katrina were both 
unintentional and purposeful (Picou and Marshall, 2007: 6).   
The fourth type of disaster discussed by Picou and Marshall (2007) includes 
terrorism. The characteristics and impacts of natural and technological disasters, as well 
as hybrid na-tech events, are pertinent for understanding the risk and ocial consequences 
of modern terrorism (Marshall, Picou, and Schlichtmann, 2004 as cited in Brunsma et al., 
2007: 7). Marshall and associates (2004) suggest the 9/11 attacks manifested many 
similarities to natural and technological disasters (cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 7). These 
similarities include the role of the government, the consequences of litigation and mental 
and physical issues (Marshall, Picou, and Gill, 2003 as cited in Bru sma et al., 2007: 7). 
Following the 9/11 attack the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was 
criticized. This was due to unequal distribution of funds and the ignorance of low-income 
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areas, such as Chinatown (Picou and Marshall, 2007: 7). This type of blame, which is 
usually seen in terrorist events, has been echoed ever since by th survivors of Hurricane 
Katrina. After the 9/11 attacks and Katrina FEMA did not fulfill their role “as the agency 
to coordinate care for those who were victims of circumstances beyond their control” (as 
cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 358). In addition, survivors of 9/11 have had emerging 
health problems since the attack. First responders have suffered elvated rates of cancer, 
and many have been disabled by various types of illness (Picou and Marshall, 2007: 8).  
Katrina survivors have also endured health related issues. Respiratory problems directly 
related with associated piles of contaminated debris, hazardous dust, and widespread 
mold in the impact area (Picou and Marshall, 2007: 8). Indeed, these similarities, high-
light the fact that technological, na-tech and terrorism all m nifest similarities in long-
term mental and physical risks to communities. These risks are important for 
understanding the diverse consequences of Katrina (Picou and Marshall, 2007: 8). 
The fifth type of disaster discussed by Picou and Marshall (2007) called “worst-
case” disaster combines all four types of past disaster events (10). Katrina fits this 
category. Picou and Marshall (2007) state that “Katrina reawakened the sociological 
imagination for many and provided an enlightened signal that reintroduced the need for 
understanding modern risks and promoting a more public sociology that is relevant to the 
social challenges that will confront society in the twenty-first century” (18). Picou and 
Marshall (2007) argue that Katrina calls for a shift in the conceptualization of disasters. 
They state that risk in the modern world is changing thus refocusing sociological inquiry. 
Hurricane Katrina produced maximum damage to the built and modified environments, 
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contaminated the biophysical environment, caused widespread mortality, produced 
serious physical health impacts for survivors, endangered severe mental h alth impacts, 
and relocated a massive segment of the population from the impact are  (Picou and 
Marshall, 2007: 10). As mentioned before, “worst-case” disasters combine elements of 
the previous four disasters. Natural forces, technological failure, ecological 
contamination, the response failure of human institutions, and the massive di placement 
of people have all amplified the severity of the impacts to the human community (Picou 
and Marshall, 2007: 10). Worst-case disasters invite a broader sociological understanding 
of the organization of social vulnerability, resiliency, manufactured uncertainty and 
socioenvironmental policy in “risk society” (Beck 1992, 2006 as cited in Bru sma et al., 
2007: 10).   
The present study has adopted the fifth “type” (worst-case disaster) to 
conceptualize Katrina. It is hard to place such a massive disaster with its many different 
outcomes into one category. In order to account for all the different social dimensions of 
the storm a more complex type should be negotiated, such as the one put forth by Picou 
and Marshall (2007).   
Importance of Exploring Culture in Disasters 
Gary R. Webb (2007) points out that disasters have a cultural dimension and 
social scientists should dedicate more time to studying it (cited in Rodriguez, Quarantelli, 
and Dynes, 2007: 430). Culture is important and shapes how people view the world that 
they live in, what they come to value and what they do (Webb, 2007 as cited in 
Rodriguez, Quarantelli, and Dynes, 2007: 439). Webb (2007) also points out that it is 
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impossible to study any aspect of social life without also studying the influence of culture 
(cited in Rodriguez, Quarantelli, and Dynes, 2007: 439).  
Popular culture provides us with a plentiful scene of disasters. For example, when 
disasters strike news crews flock to the scene and provide around the clock the coverage 
and film producers make millions of dollars on special effects that tell stories of man 
against nature (Webb, 2007 as cited in Rodriguez, Quarantelli, and Dynes, 2007: 430). 
Cable networks provide continuous coverage of the weather and periodic recollections of 
past storms and video games give people the opportunity to be the hero and save an entir
city from complete ruin and disaster (Webb, 2007 as cited in Rodriguez, Quarantelli, and 
Dynes, 2007: 430). 
Researches know far less about the above cultural dimensions of disasters than 
they do about human response to disaster, particularly in terms social tructure (Webb, 
2007 as cited in Rodriguez, Quarantelli, and Dynes, 2007: 439). Webb (2007) finds this 
problematic and promotes further work in culture and disaster (cited in Rodriguez, 
Quarantelli, and Dynes, 2007: 439). The present study aimed to do just that. By 
examining newspapers a more comprehensive understanding of the cultural dimension of 
the looter in disasters can be obtained.  
Looting: What Do We Know? 
 Sociological research is limited in terms of examining looting, especially in the 
wake of a disaster. According to Kelly Frailing and Dee Wood Harper (2007) disaster 
research literature, for the most part, only provides speculation regarding the core causes 
of antisocial behavior, focusing almost entirely on crowd behavior or individual 
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motivation (cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 54). Further, there is no 
systematic qualitative research that accounts for looting in the larg r sociological context 
(Frailing and Harper, 2007 as cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 54-55). 
Nevertheless, the literature that does exist is important and contributes to our 
understanding of the looter.    
Looting Occurrences 
 Quarentelli and Dynes (1970) argue that actual looting incidents after disaster  are 
rare. Walker (2005) suggests that when looting does occur it usually happens in small 
groups that are covert rather than in large groups of people that are out in the open. 
Factors that can alter this include basic needs (food and water) no  being met, a disaster 
area characterized by widespread poverty, and a poorly managed respons  to disaster 
(Walker, 2005). These types of conditions existed during and after Katrina, and in the 
year following the Hurricane. However, many of the reported accounts of violent 
criminal behavior proved false. This is not to say that criminal activity was nonexistent, 
but rather to suggest that the crisis created many stories that were later refuted (Bates and 
Swan, 2007). According to Bates and Swan (2007) many looters were not criminals 
engaged in breaking the law. Instead, they were people trying to survive a catastrophe in 
which normal means of obtaining necessities had been withdrawn and where government 
had failed to help people sustain life.  
Disaster vs. Civil Disturbances 
 In contrast to other disaster literature, Frailing and Harper (2007) argue that 
looting may be the most common crime to occur after a natural disaster takes place (cited 
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in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 53). For example, Frailing and Harper (2007) 
mention looting followed the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 (Morris, 2002); the flood 
of Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, in 1972 (Erikson, 1976); the flood caused by Hurricane 
Agnes in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania, in 1972 (Siman, 1977); and the earthquake that hit 
Tangshan, China, in 1976 (Zhou, 1997). Moreover, Frailing and Harper (2007) also 
conclude that looting did occur in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (cited in 
Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 53). 
 Moreover, within disaster literature, there is a widespread notion that looting is 
nonexistent in the wake of natural disasters. However, it does occur in ivil disturbances, 
such as riots. Dynes and Quarantelli (1968) cite a review of natural disasters conducted 
by the Disaster Center of Ohio State University that found extremely low verifiable rates 
in forty natural disasters throughout the United States (Frailing and Harper, 2007 as cited 
in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 54). Further, Dynes and Quarantelli (1968) argue 
that the little looting that does emerge may be due to a continual civil disturbance 
(Frailing and Harper, 2007 as cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 54). In their 
study, Dynes and Quarantelli (1968) conclude that looting during civil disturbances in the 
1960’s was an attempt to redistribute property (Frailing and Harper, 2007 as cited in 
Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 54).  
 Later, Dynes and Quarantelli (1968) added to their research that looting during 
civil disturbances is usually done by local residents in full view of others with their 
support (Frailing and Harper, 2007 as cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 54). 
On the other hand, Dynes and Quarantelli (1968) also argue that looting af er natural 
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disasters is committed by outsiders with no support of the locals (Frailing and Harper, 
2007 as cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 54). The right to property during a 
civil disturbance becomes collective instead of individual. Therefore, Quarantelli and 
Dynes (1970) maintain looting becomes normative and as a result, looting in hese types 
of circumstances is meant as a way of protest against the conditions that started the civil 
disturbance in the first place (Frailing and Harper, 2007 as cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, 
and Picou, 2007: 54). 
Media’s Portrayal of Katrina 
Images of Looting 
 Many pictures shown in the media after Katrina were displayed with little or no 
interpretation. Benjamin R. Bates and Rukhsana Ahmed (2007) argue that this 
inconsistency was so great that, in some cases, information was dismissed when it 
contradicted the images (cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 195). Bates and Ahmed (2007) 
provide an example of an exchange between Sean Hannity of Fox News and Louisiana 
Attorney General Charles Foti that drives home this point: 
 
HANNITY: These images of looting have literally shocked a nation, how bad is 
it? 
FOTI: I flew over the area myself today. And there were few p ople on the street 
at the time I flew over. But we will aggressively… 
HANNITY: Can I interrupt you, Charles? You seem to be minimizing it, but the 
images that we have and that we have been showing, do not really back up what 
you are saying. (Hannity and Colmes, 2005 as cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 
195) 
 
 
 What happened in the above was passage was a difference of observation. Foti, an 
eyewitness, reported there was little looting, while Hannity relied on only images from 
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his studio in New York which may not have been representative (Bates and Ahmed, 2007 
as cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 196). In addition, the same images were hown over 
and over, even though more cases of looting may not have occurred. Foti recogniz d the 
limits of his observation, but Hannity did not recognize similar limits. Instead, Hannity 
claimed the images were more real than Foti’s direct observations (Bates and Ahmed, 
2007 as cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 196).  
 In sum, Bates and Ahmed (2007) argue that the media portrayal of Katrina in the 
first seventy-two hours following the event was problematic (cited in Bates and Swan, 
2007: 197). They refer to the way particular news networks (CNN and Fox News) framed 
the reporting on Katrina as “disaster pornography” (cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 197). 
Viewers that tuned in could not consider themselves “well-informed” (Bates and Ahmed, 
2007 as cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 197) People not only watched for information but 
for entertainment purposes. In the end, media viewers fell victim to “voyeurism” (Bates 
and Ahmed as cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 197). In other words, Bates and Ahme
(2007) make the argument that the images of Katrina fancied the sense of sight, not 
cognition (Lester and Ross, 2003 as cited in Bates and Swan, 2007:197). 
Chaos and Race Relations 
 Shortly after Katrina made its way out of New Orleans, the natio l press painted 
the city as chaotic and being under siege. For the next week reports of looting and 
violence were highlighted in the Superdome and Convention Center (Agid, 2007 as cited 
in Bates and Swan, 2007: 67). Images in the press gave the impression that those that 
stayed in New Orleans were “out of control,” “wild,” “thugs” and “criminals” (Agid, 
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2007 as cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 67). Shana Agid (2007) argues that these 
descriptions were mostly applied to the black residents of New Orleans who survived the 
storm (cited in Bates and Swan: 67). These were the individuals who lacked the resources 
to leave even when Mayor Nagin issued a mandatory order to evacuate. To drive the 
point home even further, two photographs circulated in the media of people making their 
way through chest-deep water with items they had taken from stores (Agid, 2007 as cited 
in Bates and Swan, 2007: 67). One photo featured two white or light skinned people with 
a caption stated that the pair had “found” the items. The other photo, ta  featured a black 
person, said he had “looted” the items (Agid 2007, as cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 67). 
Agid (2007) argues that many felt these were clear signs that black New Orleans were 
being criminalized (cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 68).   
Exaggerated Claims 
 Russell R. Dynes and Havidan Rodriguez (2007) argue that the media’s portrayal 
after Katrina was exaggerated, oversimplified and irrational (cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, 
and Picou, 2007). Through their analysis they find and expose frames used by the media. 
Dynes and Rodriguez (2007) discuss five frames that emerged from their study. The 
frames identified include “finding damage,” “finding death,” “finding help,” “finding 
authority,” and “finding the bad guys” (cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou 2007: 25). 
The latter frame becomes of interest for this study. The “bad guys” that Dynes and 
Rodriguez (2007) refer to, include those who looted during Katrina’s aftermath (cited in 
Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007).  
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 Dynes and Rodriguez (2007) maintain that while it is common for rumors of all 
sorts of antisocial behavior and looting to emerge after a disaster, the sheer volume of 
rumors written in newspapers were unparalleled in Katrina (cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, 
and Picou, 2007: 29). For example, reports from within the Superdome maintained that 
200 dead bodies were inside. The actual total was six; of these, four died of natural 
causes, one committed suicide and the other from a drug overdose (Dynes and Rodriguez, 
2007 as cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 29). In reference to looting, 
different observers can draw different conclusions. For instance, is that person shifting 
through the belongings of a friend or relative or are they looting? Is the shopping cart that 
person is pushing filled with their own clothing that they savaged from their flooded 
home or did they steal it from a local clothing store? According to Dynes and Rodriguez 
(2007) claims of looting after a disaster are common but valid cases re rare (cited in 
Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 30).  
 Dynes and Rodriguez (2007) argue that the media frame disasters in rms of the 
themes described here (i.e. finding the bad guys) because the information they report 
(inaccurate or not) significantly impacts how organizations, governmnts and the general 
populations will perceive disasters (cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 32). 
Dynes (1998) argues that the media define what a disaster is (Dynes and Rodrigeuz, 2007 
as cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 30). Dynes and Rodriguez (2007) claim 
that the media can play a positive role after disasters but they also can provide biased and 
inaccurate information that exaggerates human suffering and loss as well as physical 
destruction (Fisher, 1994; Perez-Lugo, 2001; Rodriguez et al. 2006 as cited in Brunsma, 
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Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 32). The media also frames a disaster in these terms because 
these types of stories are considered “newsworthy.” They purposely pick stories that will 
captivate their audience to increase viewer ship and increase ratings (Dynes and 
Rodriguez, 2007 as cited in Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou, 2007: 32).  
 Rodriguez also conducted research with Joseph Trainor and  Enrico L. Quarantelli 
in 2006. In their work, Rising to the Challenges of a Catastrophe:The Emergent and 
Prosocial Behavior following Hurricane Katrina, suggest that the mass media presented 
a dramatic picture of how individuals, groups and organizations in New Orleans reacted 
to the impact of Hurricane Katrina.  The images that were broadcasted in the media were 
those that portrayed Louisiana in a state of complete chaos and disorganization; 
regression to animal-like behavior; and a complete loss of social control, agencies a d 
personnel.  The major argument presented within their work is that emergent activities in 
New Orleans showed a different and opposite pattern of those suggested by the media.  
Throughout the article it is argued that emergent behavior surfaced during Hrricane 
Katrina.  Due to the fact that most of the citizens in New Orleans were not able to act in 
traditional ways, most individuals and groups rose to the challenge by engaging in new
but relevant coping behavior.  
In Metaphors Matter:  Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their Consequences 
in Hurricane Katrina, Kathleen Tierney, Christine Bevc, and Erica Kuligowski (2006) 
discuss how the images conveyed by the media during Hurricane Katrina nd the days 
that followed left impressions on the general public and also provided justifications for 
official actions that were undertaken to manage the disaster.  Ti ney et al (2006) argue 
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that the media promoted images even when the media organizations themselves had little 
ability to verify what was actually going on in many parts of the impacted areas.  The 
initial media coverage of Hurricane Katrina’s impact was quickly replaced by reports that 
portrayed disaster victims as violent criminals and opportunistic looters (Tierney et al, 
2006).  The same media reports presented individual and group behavior following the 
Katrina disaster through the lens of civil unrest.  Later, news reports shifted again and 
began to represent New Orleans as a war zone and drew parallels between the conditions 
of New Orleans to those of Iraq (Tierney et al, 2006).  It is likely that these media frames 
helped guide and justify actions undertaken by law enforcement and military units that 
were given the responsibility to deal with the emergency response after the disaster. In 
general, the media coverage fueled further arguments that only military power is capable 
of efficient action during times of disaster (Tierney et al, 2006).  
 In sum, the overarching theme found in these works uncover that the media’s 
coverage during the unfolding of Katrina’s aftermath was based on inaccurate 
assumptions and rumor. Further, the media did little to verify the stories they released to 
the public. Thus, making its coverage deficient and deceptive. Other social rese rchers 
reveal similar findings. The following include studies that exemplify this point further 
about media coverage but in a different social context. 
Lepre, Walsh-Childers, and Chance:  Managed care.  Carolyn Ringer Lepre, Kim 
Walsh-Childers and Jean Carver Chance (2003), in their work, Newspaper coverage 
portrays managed care negatively, suggest that the news media is responsible for 
explaining and providing the public with information surrounding national issues. When 
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the issue is as complex as the organization, delivery and financing of health care, news 
coverage is insufficient and misleading.  When it comes to the debate of health issues, the 
news media determines whose viewpoints are put out for public consumption, what 
aspects of the health care system are discussed and in what context.     
  Hardin and Zuegner:  Golf during the 1920’s. In Life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
golf balls:  Magazine Promotion of golf during the 1920’s, Robin Hardin and Carol 
Zuegner (2003), argue that there were many factors that contributed to the rise of golf 
popularity in the 1920’s.  Their work demonstrates how national magazines contributed 
to the growth and popularity of the sport.  How the media frames an issue determines 
how the public will perceive it.  Thus, it was argued that magazines were one of the true 
mass media of the decade and it contributed to the sports growth by the way they framed 
it.     
Conclusion 
The literature offers insight into the different frames that can be extracted from 
the news media.  The news media are often responsible for explaining and providing their 
audiences with information about important national issues.  A key theme found in the 
literature is that the media can often be misleading and give insufficient informati n. 
Despite this conclusion, the media has been and remains to be a prominent vessel for 
providing the public with information surrounding national issues. The way the media 
frames a public issue determines how it will be presented to the public at large.
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Method 
  
The act of looting, for the most part, is a poorly understood phenomenon within 
sociology research. While the focus of this research was not to uncover when, where or 
why looting occurs, it did aim to explain how the idea of the looter is situated in 
American culture. In other words, it did not seek to understand the logistics of looting 
itself; rather it sought to understand the perceptions that Americans have of looters during 
and after disasters. Specifically, the purpose of this research was to analyze the social 
construction of looters during and after Hurricane Katrina. In order to accomplish this, I 
employed three major United States newspapers to analyze the idea of the lo ter in 
America. These newspapers include The New York Times, The Washington Post and the 
Chicago Tribune. 
 It is my conviction that newspapers serve as a prominent distributor of ideas to 
American culture. But just as newspapers writers create ideas, they also reflect them. 
Newspapers provide a mirror of reflection of the public’s fears and values. Newspapers 
expose collective thought on a particular topic or group. Therefore, reliance on 
newspapers is a useful tool in helping us understand how the looter fits into our society as 
a category of person. Other researchers who have used newspapers in published research 
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include: Welch, Fenwick & Roberts (1998), Chermak (1992), Best (1991), Fishman 
(1978) and Lofquist, (1997).
I have selected The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Chicago 
Tribune for three reasons.  First, each newspaper provides national coverage of news.  
Second, each newspaper has a large circulation.  Third, each newspaper represents a 
different political spectrum, with The New York Times taking a liberal slant, The 
Washington Post a moderate slant and the Chicago Tribune a conservative slant.¹   
 For this research, the inclusion of three different politically oriented newspapers is 
important for two reasons.  First, by including liberal, moderate and conservative 
perspectives a broader view of looting frames were obtained.  Simultaneously, bia  was 
reduced because all three prominent political persuasions within the United Stats were 
accounted for.  Second, by selecting newspapers with different political persuasions, the 
possible influence of political bias in framing the looter was analyzed. 
 The New York Times i  distributed in the United States and many other nations 
worldwide.  It has won ninety-one Pulitzer Prizes; the most prestigious award for 
journalism in the US which is presented each year by Columbia University. When 
referring to people, it uses titles, rather than last names.  Its headlines tend to be wordy, 
and, for major stories, come with subheadings giving further details.  Some conservatives 
believe that The New York Times’ reportage have a consistent and pronounced liberal 
                                                
 
¹ The political slant of each newspaper is of my own assessment.  
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slant, particularly on social issues. A 2005 study, conducted by Tim Groseclose and 
Jeffrey Milyo (2005) of media coverage over the past ten years ranked The New York 
Times as the third most liberal of twenty major media outlets ranked by Americans for 
Democratic Action’s guidelines for lawmakers’ votes on selected issues of importance to 
liberals.  For the year ending December 2005, its average daily circulation was 1,135,800 
and its Sunday circulation was 1,684,700 (Audit Bureau of Circulation).  It is recognized 
as the top circulating newspaper in the United States.  
The Washington Post is the largest and oldest newspaper in Washington, D.C.  
The Washington Post takes the position that its news coverage is politically neutral; an 
assertion that has supporters and critics. Though the majority of paper’s political 
endorsements have historically been awarded to Democratic candidates, in recent years it 
has regularly published several right of center columnists, including George Will, Charles 
Krauthammer and Michael Kelly. As of September 2005, its average daily circulat on 
was 715,181 and its Sunday circulation was 983,243 (Audit Bureau of Circulations). It is 
the fifth largest newspaper in the country by circulation, behind The New York Times, The 
Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal, and USA Today. 
 The Chicago Tribune is a major daily newspaper based in Chicago, Illinois. It is 
the principal daily newspaper of the Midwestern United States and one of the ten largest 
daily newspapers in the nation, with a Sunday circulation of 957,212 (Audit Bureau of 
Circulations).  In a recent statement of principles published in the Tribune's print and 
online editions, the paper's editorial board described the newspaper's philosophy, from 
which is excerpted the following: 
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The Chicago Tribune believes in the traditional principles of limited government; 
maximum individual responsibility; minimum restriction of personal liberty, 
opportunity and enterprise. It believes in free markets, free will and freedom of 
expression. These principles, while traditionally conservative, are guidelines and 
not reflexive dogmas.  
 
The Tribune brings a Midwestern sensibility to public debate. It is suspicious of 
untested ideas.  
 
The Tribune places great emphasis on the integrity of government and the private 
institutions that play a significant role in society. The newspaper does this in t e 
belief that the people cannot consent to be governed unless they have knowledge 
of, and faith in, the leaders and operations of government. The Tribune embraces 
the diversity of people and perspectives in its community. It is dedicated to the 
future of the Chicago region (ChicagoTribune.com).     
 
            
 In 2004, the Tribune endorsed President Bush for re-election. This decision was 
consistent with its unwavering support for the Republican Party (it has not endorsed a 
Democrat for President since 1872, when it backed Horace Greeley, a former Republican 
Party newspaper editor). It has endorsed Democrats for lesser offices, including recent 
endorsements of Barack Obama for the Senate and Democrat Melissa Bean, who 
defeated Philip Crane, the House of Representatives' longest-serving Republican. The 
Tribune also reported on the scandals surrounding Illinois governor George Ryan (a 
Republican) during Ryan's previous term as Secretary of State. The Tribune endorsed 
Ryan for Governor despite this reporting.                                                                                                                              
 In this research I utilized a qualitative approach. Qualitative research, broadly 
defined, means “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of 
statistical procedures or other means of quantification” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) also claim that qualitative methods can be used to better 
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understand any phenomenon about which little is known (Hoepfl, 1997). Further, 
qualitative measures are appropriate when quantitative measures cannot effectively 
describe or interpret a situation. Research problems tend to be framed as open-ended 
questions that will support the possibility of new information (Hoepfl, 1997). Therefore, 
the qualitative approach was desirable when examining how newspapers described the 
“looter” during and after the event of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 because it allowed for 
the discovery of new information on a topic that lacks considerable sociological 
examination.                                                                                                   
Research Procedure                                                                                                             
Study Design                                                                                                                                 
 The type of qualitative research method this research utilized was frame anlysis.  
Frame analysis is a research tool that focuses on which parts of reality are brought to our 
attention and which parts are excluded (Goffman, 1974). Goffman (1974) argued that 
individuals classify, organize and interpret life experiences to make sense of them. These 
frames, which inform our interpretations, enable people “to locate, perceive, identify, a d 
label” events and occurrences, thus rendering meaning, organizing experiences, and 
guiding actions (Goffman, 1974).   In other words, frames can be thought of as cognitive 
structures that guide the perception and representation of reality.  Frames organize our 
subjective involvement, they tell us how to relate to and how to feel and think about self 
and others (Goffman, 1974).  
In defining frame analysis, Goffman (1974) assumes that definitions of a situation 
are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events and our 
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subjective involvement in them.  According to König (2006), frame analyses that 
researchers speak of today are only loosely connected to Goffman’s original fame 
analysis.  Since Goffman’s time there are three subject areas within frame analysis that 
have developed.  These include: management and organizational studies, social 
movement studies, and media studies (König, 2006). The lines separating these three 
domains are not clear cut.  They all deal directly with cultural frames but they rest in 
different settings.  Although all three subject areas are interconnected and create a 
foundation for this research, it is my belief that the area of media studies will provide the 
most lucid framework for the purpose of this project.  
In media studies, Entman (1993) is credited with its starting point. Data are 
usually collected from the print media and different forms of qualitative and quantitative 
content analysis techniques are the preferred empirical methods. According to Tuchman 
(1978), the mass media are responsible for actively setting the frames of reference that 
viewers or readers use to interpret and discuss public issues.  Neuman, Just and Crigler 
(1992) maintain that the media slants the stories they present to the general public. 
Meaning, the media takes into account the public’s decision-making process and 
judgments (Neuman, Just and Crigler, 1992). 
 Others have defined framing on a more general level.  Triandafyllidou and Fotiou 
(1998) argue that frames are identified as symbolic-interpretative constructs.  These 
constructs include images, symbols or beliefs shared by people within society. 
Triandafyllidou and Fotiou (1998) argue that each society displays a unique set of 
interpretive schemes.  These interpretive schemes are used by people to makesense of 
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the world.  Thus, the concept of frames refers to everyday use of such schemes that give 
social reality meaning (Triandafyllidou and Fotiou, 1998).  William Gamson (1989), 
refers to a frame as a “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning” to 
events related to an issue (157).  Framing can also be viewed as placing informat on in 
context so that certain elements of the issue get more attention from a person.  Nelson,
Oxley, & Clawson (1997) maintain framing involves the selection and highlighting of 
some information and the exclusion of other information. As quoted by Entman (1993), 
“…to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them mor  salient 
in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (53).”   Todd 
Gitlin (1980), labeled frames as follows, “Frames are principles of selection, emphasis 
and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and 
what matters (6).”   
 This research drew upon the definitions of frames from Goffman (1974), Gitlin 
(1980) and Entman (1993).  For the purpose of this research, frames select, emphasize 
and present some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more significant i  
written text and pictures, which consequently highlight a particular social problem, causal 
interpretation or moral evaluation. Frames are not consciously manufactured but are
unconsciously adopted in the course of communication.  Frames organize an individual's 
perception of media, public, or private communication, in particular the meanings 
attributed to words or pictures. Frames define which words or pictures are select d, 
emphasized and presented as well as the words or pictures that are not.  Media frames can 
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be created by the mass media or by specific political or social movements or 
organizations.   
 Thus, the way in which the media frames an issue sets an agenda of attributes and 
influences how the public will perceive community and nation-wide concerns.  The slant 
or angle that the news media takes influences how the general public will think about and 
accept a particular event. Therefore, the ways in which newspapers portrayed the looting 
that took place during Hurricane Katrina shaped the perception of the public about the 
looter. The newspapers also contributed to the popularity of the subject of looting and 
helped situate the idea of looter in American culture. These frames represent one way of 
analyzing coverage during and after Hurricane Katrina. The following section provides a 
fully detailed description of how the frame analysis of this research was conducted.                                                                                              
 Sample                                                                                                                                          
 The sources used to investigate this research question include analysis of the two 
weeks following Katrina in The New York Times, The Washington Post and the Chicago 
Tribune.  I have chosen to use the two weeks following Hurricane Katrina for two 
reasons.  First, analyzing data for a two week span keeps the research manageable for a 
thesis size. Second, this period provides the most in-depth media coverage of the 
hurricane.                                                                                              
The ProQuest and LexisNexis websites were used to obtain and retrieve actual 
articles. Using ProQuest and LexisNexis achieves, I searched The New York Times, The 
Washington Post and the Chicago Tribune during the sample period.  An advanced 
search was conducted.  All articles containing the words or phrases “looter,” “looters,” 
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“looting” and “Hurricane Katrina” and were selected. Next, I read the headlin s and 
abstracts and eliminated those articles that did not talk specifically about “lo ters,” or the 
act of “looting,” in reference to “Hurricane Katrina.” In other words, the key words 
“looter,” “looters,” and “looting” had to be mentioned simultaneously with the key words 
“Hurricane Katrina” in order to be kept for analyzing. Headlines, and abstracts when 
available, were copied from Internet pages into word files.   
 The analysis included 59 articles. Upon reading each article looting frames wer  
extracted. Only the sentences that described the context in which looters or the act of 
looting occurred were saved for analysis. The following two passages serve as an 
example of the types of sentences that were used for investigation and thus creating th  
looting frames. These particular examples fell under the frame “lawlessnes .”  The New 
York Times article titled, Bush Pledges More Troops as the Evacuation Grows stated the 
following about looters in Hurricane Katrina:  
 
Hundreds of newly arrived National Guard troops patrolled the lawless streets of 
New Orleans. Beginning with the task of wrestling control from thugs and looters 
and restoring order in a city that had all but surrendered to death and disorder 
after Katrina.   
 
 
Another article in The Washington Post described the aftermath of Katrina: 
 
The hardship and suffering that attended Hurricane Katrina when it lashed the city 
Monday morning had devolved by yesterday into something between a disaster 
zone and state of nature: Officials said thousands may be dead; shots report fired 
at a rescue helicopter and a hospital trying to evacuate its patients; trash fires 
burned and fecal matter befouled the city; looters and carjackers, some of them 
armed, have run rampant. 
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A total of 11 frames were originally extracted from all three newspapers. None of 
the frames were specific to just one newspaper. In other words, the original 11frames 
were universal throughout each newspaper. They included: Age of the looter, 
chaos/lawlessness created by looting, crime committed by looters (other than looting 
itself), fear of the looter, gender of the looter, morality of the looter, race of the looter, 
violence perpetrated by the looter, punishment of those involved in looting, protection 
sought from looting and financial strain of home owners and store merchants due to 
looting.  
Next, for each newspaper, frames were typed and saved into word files. I 
conducted a count to tally how many times each frame appeared in each newspaper for 
each event. For example, in the Chicago Tribune the “chaos/lawlessness” frame was 
extracted 17 times for Hurricane Katrina, rendering it the number one fram or that 
newspaper. The top three frames for each newspaper remained in the sample for 
additional analysis. The remaining frames fell out of the study. 
Study Limitations 
 According to Dietram A. Scheufele (1999), Entman (1993) referred to framing as 
“scattered conceptualization.”  Previous studies have lacked clear conceptual definitions 
and have relied on context-specific, rather than generally applicable operationalizations 
(Entman, 1993).  Brosius and Eps (1995) argue that frames are not generally applicable 
concepts. It is argued that research on framing is characterized by theoretical and 
empirical vagueness (Scheufele, 1999).  As quoted by Scheufele (1999), “Partly because 
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of these vague conceptualizations, the term fra ing has been used repeatedly to label 
similar but distinctly different approaches.” 
 König (2006) maintains that qualitative frame analysis studies rarely reveal the 
type of measurement that was used.  Even in studies that are well documented, it is hard
to pull out which mechanisms were used to arrive at particular frames and how they have 
been measured empirically. However, also König (2006) argues that frames do not limit, 
rather they enable the perception of and communication of physical and social reality.  
For Goffman, Gitlin and Gans frames are mandatory for communications.  Frames are 
scaffolds needed for any type of creditable story (König, 2006). 
 Frames analysis looks for key themes within a text and shows how cultural 
themes shape our understanding of events.  Within the media, frame analysis shows how 
aspects of the language and structure of news items emphasize certain aspects nd omits 
others.  As a result, frame analysis gives us a unique understanding of how the looter has 
been characterized within the event of Hurricane Katrina in a way that would otherwise 
be unreachable with more traditional qualitative methods.        
 Conclusion                                                                                                                            
 Limited literature exists on the social and ideological notions of the looter in 
American culture. This study expands our sociological understanding of the looter as a 
category of person in Hurricane Katrina. By conducting a frame analysis of The New 
York Times, The Washington Post and the Chicago Tribune a more lucid understanding 
of the looter during and after disasters is fashioned and thus contributing to the field of
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sociology. The following chapter uncovers the results of the frame analysis in an attempt 
to answer the research questions put forth by this examination.     
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CHAPTER IV  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of this study was to identify how major U.S. newspapers framed the 
problem of looting in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. The papers examined 
include The New Times, The Washington Post and Chicago Tribune. The papers selected 
represent three political voices in American social life: liberal, moderate and 
conservative. Articles were collected between August 29, 2005 and September 11, 2005, 
a period representing the onset of the disaster and its immediate emergency period.  
The questions I sought to answer were threefold: First, how have looters in 
Hurricane Katrina been framed by the news media?  Second, how have looters in 
Hurricane Katrina been differentially framed by these three powerful continuum of 
voices? And third, were media frames of perceived Katrina looters instrumental in re-
establishing social order? 
When the answers to these questions are pieced together a truly unique 
sociological story can be told. One in which Katrina can be “understood as collision 
between a natural force and what turned out to be a strangely vulnerable social order” 
(Erikson, 2007 as cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: xx). The piecing together of this story 
takes root within the newspapers. It is here the idea of the looter emerges and so the story 
begins.
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Looting Frames 
Certain pragmatic themes or frames emerged around the perceived problem of 
looting in newspaper articles. Eleven looting frames were extracted from the entire 
sample. In other words, 11 frames were extracted universally throughout each newspaper; 
The New York Times, The Washington Post and Chicago Tribune. I conducted a tally to 
see how many times each frame appeared in each newspaper. The top four frames fo  
each newspaper remained in the sample for additional analysis identified here as property 
crime, lawlessness, policing, and race. The following provides specific descriptions of 
each frame as well as representative articles that appeared in one of the three newspapers; 
The New York Times, The Washington Post and Chicago Tribune. 
Before moving into the specifics of each frame I would like to stress four points. 
First, the following frames were not the only ones employed by the newspapers. Instead, 
I make the argument that these frames and their associated discourses were among the 
most prominent. Second, these frames should not be considered independent of each 
other. They are, in most cases, tightly intertwined and mutually dependent. Third, the 
included newspaper excerpts provide examples of the common themes found throughout 
the newspapers, so less common frames fell out of the analysis. Forth, the following 
frame analysis should not be confused with a textual analysis. Instead, the aim here s to 
describe the cultural frames that lay below the surface of the text. In other words, I have 
deconstructed the text to find the existing themes. Next, I discuss each of these our 
prominent frames separately. 
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Property Crime 
Looting was associated with violent crime and property crime.  Examples of these 
crimes include murder, rape, mugging, carjacking, arson, robbery, vandalism and 
burglary. Although looting was associated with numerous acts of violent crime, property 
crime was associated most frequently with looting. Specifically, looting and v ndalism, 
in most cases, were grouped together. For example, on September 1, a New York Times 
story emphasized the forced entry by looters into various stores: 
  
“…looters brazenly ripped open gates and ransacked stores for food, clothing, 
television sets, computers, jewelry, and guns.” (McFadden and Blumenthal, 2005) 
 
 
A few weeks later, another New York Times tory was published that reinforced the  
problem of the vandalistic looter. Here, looters struck before the city flooded. Looters 
tore open store doors, broke windows, forced their way into banks and destroyed vending 
machines in the convention center:  
 
September 29: “The actual, serious crime began, in the recollection of many, 
before the catastrophic failure of the levees flooded the city, and much of it 
consisted of crimes of opportunity rather than assault. On the morning of Monday, 
Aug. 29, in the half hour or so that the eye of Hurricane Katrina fell on the city - 
an illusory moment of drawn breath, sunshine and fair breezes - the looters struck, 
said Capt. Anthony W. Canatella, the police commander in the Sixth 
District….Using a chain hitched to a car, they tore open the steel doors at the back 
of a pawn shop called Cash America on Claiborne Avenue…. At dusk on Aug. 
29, looters broke windows along Canal Street and swarmed into drugstores, shoe 
stores and electronics shops, Captain Anderson said. Some tried, without success, 
to break into banks, and others sought to take money from A.T.M.'s…. ‘I saw 
Coke machines being torn up - each and every one of them was busted on the 
second floor,’ said Percy McCormick, a security guard who spent four nights in 
the convention center and was interviewed in Austin, Tex.” (Dwyer and Drew, 
2005) 
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The Washington Post published a similar story of how looters broke into department and 
grocery stores: 
 
August 31: “Even as the floodwaters rose, looters roamed the city, sacking 
department stores and grocery stores and floating their spoils away in plastic 
garbage can, watched unmolested in many cases by patrolling police and National 
Guardsmen....Looting began on Canal Street in the morning, as people carrying 
plastic garbage pails waded through waist-deep water to break into department 
stores. In drier areas, looters raced into smashed stores and ph rmacies, and by 
nightfall the pillage was widespread.” (Gugliotta and Whoriskey, 2005) 
 
 
Chicago Tribune followed suit. Once again, looters were caught up in acts of vandalism. 
They damaged vehicles and crashed a forklift through a local pharmacy: 
 
September 1: “But the streets of the city, already awash in a toxic brew of sewage 
and seawater, faced another danger from roving bands of looters. They 
commandeered vehicles, crashed a forklift through the doors of a shuttered 
pharmacy and helped themselves to food, drugs, clothing, electronic equipmnt 
and firearms from ravaged stored across the city. Gunfire was heard throughout 
the day.” (Witt and Martinez, 2005) 
 
 
All four of these excepts illustrate the “vandalistic” qualities of the New Orleans looter as 
put forth by the newspapers. In many cases, those who looted were also sure to destroy 
property. Looters not only stole goods from various stores they did so in a destructive and 
threatening manner.  
Lawlessness 
 Looters were frequently described as uncivilized and unpredictable. Their actions 
were irresponsible, impulsive and in some instances life threatening. In the days 
following Katrina media reports constructed the victims in New Orleans “s lawless, 
violent, exploitative, and almost less than human (Tierney et al., 2006: 63).” A direct link 
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existed between the behavior of the looters and the atmosphere of the city. The 
impression was that the individuals who looted were not reacting to their hostile 
environment (i.e. trying to survive); instead they were deviants contributing to the chaotic 
scene by stealing what did not belong to them. In this way, looters were depicted as 
abnormal and lacking moral fiber. Looters were seen less as human beings trying to 
survive a devastating tragedy and more like heartless, robotic villains using the disaster to 
their advantage. For example, on August 31, a New York Times tory categorized the 
looters as “opportunistic thieves.” Further, the looters irresponsible and life threatening 
behavior is highlighted when the shooting of a police officer is addressed: 
 
“Looting broke out as opportunistic thieves cleaned out the abandoned stores for a 
second night. In one incident, officials said a police officer was shot and critically 
wounded.”… “These are not individuals looting. These are large groups of armed 
individuals.” (Treaster and Kleinfield, 2005) 
 
 
The Washington Post depicted looters as having a one mind track to steal. Instead of 
being concerned about the tragedy in which they just endured looters were painted as 
heartless villains using the disaster to their advantage: 
 
September 2: “What could be going through the minds of people who survive an 
almost biblical tragedy, find themselves in a hellscape of the dead and the 
dispossessed and promptly decide to go looting? Obviously, not much: Stealing a 
rack of fancy clothes when there’s no place to wear them or a television when 
there’s no electricity does not suggest a lot of deep, subtle forethought.” 
(Robinson, 2005) 
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One day later, The Washington Post depicted looters as “the lowest form of human being 
haunting the Earth”: 
 
September 3: “Looting is pretty bad. People are taking clothing, liquor -- things 
that aren’t life-surviving, material items. I don’t have a problem if someone is 
trying to get food or water, but beyond that, we’re bustn’em…What we’re getting 
worried about is people are starting to shoot us now…That’s the lowest form of 
human being haunting the Earth.” (Vedantam and Klein, 2005) 
 
 
Chicago Tribune described the uncivilized atmosphere of the city after Katrina. I  
particular, looters were again described as “opportunistic” and taking advantage of the 
disaster:  
 
August 31: “Across New Orleans, the rule of law, like the city’s levees, could not 
hold out after Hurricane Katrina. The desperate and opportunistic took advant ge 
of the overwhelmed police force and helped themselves to food and water, as well 
as television sets, sporting goods and firearms.” (Barringer and Longman, 2005) 
 
 
A couple days later a Chicago Tribune article questioned the moral fiber of looters. They 
were seen less as human beings trying to survive a devastating tragedy and more like 
abnormal, unashamed criminals: 
 
September 2: “I have always been slightly amused by looters. They’ve always 
seemed unashamed to show off their lawlessness even with TV crews in 
helicopters recording their actions.… The criminal looters of New Orleans need to 
be held responsible for making matters worse in a city already overrun by hunger, 
desperation and disease.…Even in the gravest situations, we need to main ain our 
humanity. Unfortunately, many people in New Orleans have failed th  character 
test. When everything gets back to normal, I hope they are ashamed of 
themselves. And I hope they spend time in rebuilt prisons.” (Greenfield, 2005) 
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Policing  
 Within the articles there was an underlining urgency to bring in as many police
and military personnel as possible in order to combat out of control looting. The need for 
additional troops and police was directed at protecting the city from looters rather than 
helping citizens in life threatening situations. Articles frequently highlighted that search 
and rescue missions were to be put on hold so that police could divert more of their 
attention to protecting the city from widespread looting. For example, on September 7, a 
New York Times tory emphasized the large number of troops it took to secure New 
Orleans from looters: 
 
 “With assistance from 4,000 National Guard troops and another 4,000 troops 
from the 82nd Airborne, New Orleans was now secure and ‘locked down,’ with 
looting reduced to minimal levels, said Warren J. Riley, the deputy superintendent 
of the New Orleans police.” (Longman and Chan, 2005) 
 
A Washington Post article highlighted that search and rescue missions were to be put on 
hold so that police could divert more of their attention to protecting the city from 
widespread looting: 
 
September 1: “Things have spiraled so out of control [in New Orleans] that the 
city’s mayor ordered police officers to focus on looters and give up the search and 
rescue efforts.” (Coats and Eggen, 2005 as cited in Tierney et al., 2006: 67) 
 
 
Chicago Tribune published a story that discussed the deployment of National Guard 
troops from eight states to help with looting occurrences. Again, search and rescue efforts 
were to be put on hold so that police could focus even more attention to the problem of 
looting: 
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September 1: “The Defense Department deployed 11,000 National Guard troops
from at least eight states to help with law enforcement, communications and 
cleanup amid reports of widespread looting, marauding gangs and 
gunfire….Blanco said she asked the White Hose to send more rescue teams, 
allowing National Guardsmen to help beleaguered New Orleans police stop the 
looting….‘Once we get the…National Guardsmen in here, we’re locking this 
place down,’ said Nagin, who late Wednesday said he was ordering some 1,500 
police to halt rescue efforts and begin patrolling the streets to stop looters.” (Witt 
and Martinez, 2005) 
 
 
Race 
In order to understand the issue of race in its entirety, as put forth by the 
newspapers, an understanding of how the news media first portrayed perc ived Katrina 
looters becomes essential. As the hurricane made its way out of New Orleans, immediate 
news reports (primarily from television news media) alluded to the idea that blacks were 
the main perpetrators of looting. Of course, these very words were not spoken but they 
did not need to be in a country where strong racial divides still exist. This idea was seen, 
noticed, but unsaid.  
Specifically, what was found in the newspapers was a reaction: a reaction to 
“make good” or to recover from the embarrassment of how Katrina looters were covered 
by the media immediately after the storm. In other words, the newspapers made an effort 
to neutralize hyperbolic language of the looter as this kind of “villainous” person. What 
the newspapers tried to accomplish, then, was a refinement of the initial media frenzy.  In 
yet another way, newspapers were trying to clear the air or sweep away the mess of initial 
news reporting. And their way of dealing with the mess or embarrassment was to simply 
state the obvious: skin color had nothing to do with looted and who did not.   
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The newspaper articles were careful not to project racially charged stereotypes 
onto those that looted. A strong effort was made to debunk the notion that blacks were 
the main perpetrators of looting. An overall consensus and awareness xisted that skin 
color was not a determining factor of who looted and who did not. While the newspapers’ 
aim was to deflate the issue of race around looting they were forc d to acknowledge its 
presence. Demographically, New Orleans, is made up of approximately 67 percent 
African American, 28 percent white, 3 percent Latino and 2 percent Asian (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census 2005 as cited in Brunsma et al., 2007: 99). With African Americans 
representing more than half of the population the discussion of race within the 
newspapers became unavoidable. For example, on September 3, a Washington Post story 
brought attention to the negative news reporting of blacks after Katrina. The underlying 
idea being that the individuals who stole material goods in the majority-black city did not 
do it because they were black. In other words, the article made it clear that race was not 
an indicator of who loots: 
 
 “And it was the looting in New Orleans that prompted M.J. of Laurel to e-mail 
me on Wednesday with this message: ‘Most people, especially non-blacks like 
me, cannot understand what makes black people go ‘berserk’ after a hurricane. 
Seems the media’s cameras only show blacks looting Foot Lockers, Wal-Marts, 
etc. Is that possible??? Is that something that only happens in poor black 
neighborhoods? Is it a race thing or poverty thing? Why don’t we see A ians, 
whites, or other races doing this or is this something the media only shows when 
blacks do it??? Either way, this sight disgusts most reasonable people…’ …But 
M.J. wasn’t asking why people loot. He wanted to know why in this timeof 
misery and ruin, black people are doing all the plundering….First, to sta e the 
obvious: The people caught stealing on camera in that majority-black city weren’t 
doing it because they were black. Just as raiders of corporate tre suries don’t do it 
because they are white. Skin color has nothing to do with the urge to take what 
doesn’t belong to you. Poverty also isn’t the reason the liquor gets stolen in a 
storm-ravaged city.” (King, 2005) 
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A Chicago Tribune article touches on this same notion: 
 
 
September 4: “Coverage of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, p rticularly the 
focus on looting, may have created an impression that black New Orl ans was on 
a rampage. It wasn’t. It is true that the vast majority of those that had no way out 
the city are black, but the images and reports of violence was unfortunate.” 
(Martinez, 2005)    
 
 
On September 6, another Chicago Tribune article made this point yet again; blacks were 
not the main perpetrators of looting: 
 
“I am worried that the first inclination of TV viewers of these events [looting] 
might be to say, ‘It’s all those black kids. They just don’t know how to behave,’ 
and so on, as though they were some kind of racial component to misbehavior. 
I’m here as an old white guy with baggage to say don’t go there. It’s not about 
race. It’s about where you come from in life.” (Madigan, 2005) 
 
Now that I have established a description or a code of understanding for each of 
the key frames I will now illustrate their relationship with the newspapers. The following 
section ranks each frame within its specified newspaper. 
Top Three Looting Frames Ranked by Newspaper 
The New York Times 
 The number one frame extracted from the T  New York Times includes property 
crime. Lawlessness was number two, followed by policing in third place. 
The Washington Post 
The number one frame extracted from the Washington Post includes property 
crime. Lawlessness was number two, followed by race in third place. 
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Chicago Tribune 
The number one frame extracted from the Chicago Tribune includes lawlessness. 
Property crime was number two, followed by policing in third place.  
The following table illustrates these results. The numbers denote the ranking of 
the listed frame within the specified newspaper.
 
Table 1. Top Three Looting Frames 
 
Looting 
Frames 
The New 
York Times 
The 
Washington 
Post 
Chicago 
Tribune 
Property 
Crime 
1 1 2 
Lawlessness 2 2 1 
Policing 3  3 
Race  3  
 
As shown above, The New York Times and The Washington Post hare their top 
two frames, with property crime taking first place and lawlessness taking second place. 
The New York Times also shares its third frame with Chicago Tribune which includes the 
policing frame. Property crime and lawlessness were extracted from all three newspapers. 
Policing was extracted from two, The New York Times and Chicago Tribune. Race was 
extracted from only one, The Washington Post. 
These looting frames provide the groundwork for the rest of the discussion. From 
the extracted looting frames additional insight was gained into the looter as an idea, as 
presented by the media. But before I proceed I would like to shift my voice from a purely 
technical, analytical tone to that of a narrative. In other words, instead of treating the rest 
of the discussion as a series of outcomes and consequences of the extracted looting 
 46
frames, I will treat the analysis as a way of telling a story. The telling of the discussion in 
this way is important. Most who have studied the media would agree that what the media 
produces as news can be understood as a type of story or an interpretation of some sort. 
In order to convey the ideas of the looter as determined by the media a narrative approach 
is helpful and captures the atmosphere in which the looter was manufactured. 
The use of the narrative in this way will link the most important ideas together in 
a linear, easy to follow manner. The scaffolding of a narrative will be used as a w y of 
conveying the emergent ideas of the thesis. The sections to follow, then, are the 
beginning of something important. 
The Arrival of Hurricane Katrina: Introduction of the Setting 
 Early morning on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall at the mouth 
of the Mississippi River near New Orleans. The hurricane came ashore as a Category 
Four storm on the Saffir-Simpson scale2 (Drye, 2005).  A hurricane of Katrina’s 
magnitude hitting the Big Easy as long been feared by emergency manageme t and 
government officials (Drye, 2005). In 2005, approximately 500,000 people resided in 
New Orleans and many of these residents lived below sea level surrounded by the 
Mississippi River, Lake Pontchartrain, and even several bays (Drye, 2005).                                     
 In the days leading up to the arrival of Katrina hundreds of thousands of residents 
began to evacuate the city (Drye, 2005). However, some residents remained behind and 
weathered what Mother Nature had in store. Bill Quigley (2006), a civil and human rights 
                                                
 
2 The Saffir-Simpson scale ranks hurricanes from one t  five according to wind speeds and destructive 
potential.   
 47
lawyer and Professor of Law at Loyola University New Orleans School of Law and his 
wife Debbie were among those that stayed. He writes of his experience in his article, “Six 
Months After Katrina: Who was Left Behind-Then and Now.” Quigley’s wife orked as 
an oncology nurse in a New Orleans hospital. She volunteered to work during the 
hurricane so that the nurses with children could evacuate with their families (Quigley, 
2006). He explains the scene at the hospital as something out of a horror film, “There 
were about 2000 people huddled in the hospital - patients, staff and families of staff and 
patients. Plate glass windows exploded in the lobby and on crosswalks and on several 
floors. Water poured in though broken windows, ceilings, and down the elevator shafts. 
Eight feet of brown floodwater surrounded us.” Quigley (2006) and his wife soon 
realized evacuating the city safely was going to be a difficult endeavor. According to 
Quigley (2006) if you wanted to leave the city then it was solely your responsibility; “self 
help” as he termed it. Quigley (2006) recalls what he saw on that frightful day from the 
hospital after the storm ravaged the city:                     
 
In the hospital, we could not see who was left behind because we did not have 
electricity or TV. We certainly knew the 2000 of us were left behind, and from 
the hospital we could see others. Some were floating in the street - face down. 
Some were paddling down the street - helping older folks get to high ground. 
Some were swimming down the streets. We could hear people left behind 
screaming for help from rooftops. We routinely heard gunshots as people trapped 
on rooftops tried to get the attention of helicopters crisscrossing the skies above. 
We could see the people trapped in the Salvation Army home a block away. We 
could hear breaking glass as people scrambled to get away from flooded one story 
homes and into the higher ground of several story office buildings. We saw 
people swimming to the local drugstore and swimming out with provisions. But 
we had no idea how many were actually left behind. The poor, especially those 
without cars, were left behind. Twenty-seven percent of the people of New 
Orleans did not have access to a car. Government authorities knew in advance that 
100,000 citizens of New Orleans did not have means of personal transportation. 
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Greyhound and Amtrak stopped service on the Saturday before the hurricane. 
These are people who did not have cars because they were poor - over 125,000 
people, 27% of the people of New Orleans, lived below the very low federal 
poverty level before Katrina. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 The poverty stricken citizens of New Orleans that Quigley describes above were 
not only fighting for survival after Katrina (and arguably before Katrina as well) but 
some of them also became a target for the media. The media portrayed many of the 
trapped citizens of New Orleans as a threat rather than a population in need. News reports 
portrayed many of these individuals as deviants that were acting out and taking adva tage 
of the devastation within the city. Among these reports was that of wide-spread looting. 
In fact, claims of looting created such media frenzy that it became a central theme in 
news coverage in the days following the disaster. This is the point in which the current 
story begins or grows. The time directly following the hurricane when devastation and 
desperation in the city was at its highest; when for the most part, only the poverty 
stricken population, rescue workers and various government officials had access to the 
city; the point in time in which looters were put under a lens and made front page news 
all across America. This moment is truly unique and plays an important role in the story. 
I shall return to the importance of this moment a little later but right now I will introduce 
the main character of the story; the New Orleans looter as a social kind.                                 
The Main Character                                                                                                                              
The Looter as a Social Kind                                                                                                                             
 Rather than moving directly into the characteristics or qualities that make up th  
New Orleans looter I would first like to establish the looter as a “social kind.” This will 
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help to situate the looter conceptually. It provides the foundation for how the looter in the 
rest of the analysis or “story” should be approached and thought about.                                                                                                             
 Steve Kroll-Smith, in his study of the 2005 flooding of New Orleans and the 1906 
earthquake and fire in San Francisco, draws on the early Chicago School of Sociology 
and the more recent work of Ian Hacking and Douglas Massey among others to argue f r 
the importance of the “social kind” in urban centers. For Hacking a social kind is not a 
physical person. Rather, a social kind is a type of social construction or idea (Hacking, 
1999 as cited in Kroll-Smith, forthcoming). Charles Tilly (1998) considers a category as 
a socially and culturally organized system of distinction (cited in Kroll-Smith, 
forthcoming). The distinctions of a category such as “looter” and “finder” are created by 
groups of people who hold the power and control the means within society. As a result, 
these categories aid in the resolution of organizational problems within society (Tilly, 
1998 as cited in Kroll-Smith, forthcoming). Massey (2007) takes this one step further and 
argues that creating and sustaining different social categories are important to the order of 
urban life (cited in Kroll-Smith, forthcoming).                                                                          
 Specifically, Kroll-Smith (forthcoming) argues that densely populated areas 
negate “close and personal ties with all but a few.” As a result, people or groups that 
reside outside of our habitual social circles become “known only by their most elemental 
or categorical features.” These features include but are not limited to language or dialect, 
skin color, type of dress and spatial location. In other words they become known as 
“those people” or “others” (Kroll-Smith, forthcoming). Kroll-Smith (forthcoming) refers 
to these others as “categories” or “kinds.” These categories or kinds are not specific of 
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any one person or group. Kroll-Smith (forthcoming) argues that these ideas or social 
kinds serve a valuable purpose; “they organize thinking about and acting within the 
always intricate web of human life.” Moreover, it is collective social and cultural forces 
that create the ideas of a specific kind or category.                                                                                    
 In sum, I propose that the looter is an example of a social kind created in part by 
news media framing. Examining the looter in this light establishes how the looter in this 
research or “narrative” should be approached. The main character should be thought 
about as an abstract idea instead of a physically present human being. The main interest 
of the story is centered on the ways in which the looter was thought about and described, 
not of the actual looter as an individual. In the unfolding of the rest of the narrative the 
“ideas” associated with the looter, not of the actual people who looted will be the 
concern. The main character then, is not a living, breathing entity. Rather, the main 
character encompasses the social and cultural “ideas” of the looter as determin d by the 
news media.                                                                                                                              
 Now that this important distinction has been made I can now move into the 
characteristics of this “kind” as determined by the three newspapers used in the current 
research. The extracted looting frames (property crime, lawlessness, policing and race) 
provide us with a guide or an understanding of how the media portrayed looters after 
Katrina. Each frame represents an underlining quality of the looter. As we will see, the 
property crime frame represents the destructive nature of the looter; the lawlessness 
frame represents the out of control or chaotic elements of the looter, the policing frame 
represents society’s need to combat the looter and the race frame represents our nations 
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racial divide. In this way, the frames, as extracted from the newspapers, bring the main 
character, the looter, to life.                                                                                    
Characterization of the Looter as Presented by the Media                                                   
 Looters as established by the media took on a “villainous-foil” quality in New 
Orleans. Herein, the “problem” or the “conflict” of the story. Looters were categorized as 
the bad guys. In their role as adversary, looters served as an obstacle for government 
officials, the New Orleans police and United States military to overcome. In their role of 
foil, looters embodied morals and values that were diametrically opposed by those that 
held power. As a result, perceived looters were recognized as the villains while 
government officials, police and military were the notable heroes. In other words, a 
distinction was made in the newspapers between “us” the good guys and “them” the bad 
guys. In yet another way, a division was established among the “haves” and “have-nots.”                      
 Examples of these villainous traits are illustrated by the extracted looting frames 
within the current research; property crime, lawlessness, policing and race. Instead of 
thinking of the frames in their technical or analytical nature think of these frames as traits 
or qualities of the looters. Again, imagine the looters as part of a story and their role is 
one of adversary. The most interesting stories have bold and unique characters that help
thicken the plot and looters in this case do just that. The frames or traits as created by the 
media contribute to the “villainous” narrative of the looters.                                                          
 In the following section I re-interrupt the persona of the looter as identified by the 
three newspapers; The New York Times, The Washington Post and Chicago Tribune by 
using the extracted frames. In other words, just as I extracted or pulled apart the looting 
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frames from the newspapers for analysis, I will now refashion them or put them back into 
the “story.” The aim here is not only to tell the story of the looter as achieved through the 
media but to drive the point home that the looting frames are not independent of each 
other. That each frame or characteristic of the perceived looter transcends into the next 
and vice versa.                                                                                                                                           
The “Bad Guys” in Action: Making Sense of the Extracted Looting Frames                 
Chaotic and Destructive Nature of the Looter (Lawlessness and Property Crime Frames)      
 News articles made it seem as if New Orleans had lost all social control a d had 
surrendered itself to the lawless behavior of thugs (Tierney et al., 2006: 67). The 
Washington Post describes the televised news reports in the days following Katrina, 
“looters have pretty much taken over the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Katrina. ‘The 
fear, of course’ said talk show host Tucker Carlson… ‘is that looting contributes to the 
sense that things are out of control, and that lawlessness begins to snowball, and that 
stealing becomes murder’” (Weeks, 2005). Carlson was not the only one to make the 
connection between looting and other forms of criminal behavior. According to other 
reports looters were not only participating in various acts of collective theft, y were 
also acting out in violent and deadly ways. Some articles even compared the Crescent 
City to that of a war zone (Tierney et. al., 2006). The New York Times described war-like 
events in the streets; “gun battles, fistfights, holdups, carjackings and marauding mobs of 
looters” (McFadden, 2005).  A different New York Times article described the thoughts of 
a man who had volunteered his fishing boat to search and rescue missions, “A shotgun 
rested in the boat next to Mr. Lovett, who said shots had been fired near him on occasion 
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during the past week. ‘I don’t feel like I am in the U.S. I feel like I’m in awar. All the 
guns, the chaos’” (Longman, 2005 as cited in Tierney et. al., 2006: 72).                                                  
 Some articles targeted the large amount of property crime committed by looters to 
help backup their claim of the lawless and dangerous behavior of looters. According t  
Chicago Tribune, “On New Orleans’ flooded Canal Street, The Associated Press 
reported, dozens of looters ripped open the steel gates on clothing and jewelry stores…” 
(Witt, 2005). Another Chicago Tribune article reported, “They commandeered vehicles, 
crashed a forklift through the doors of shuttered pharmacy and helped themselves to food,
drugs, clothing, electronic equipment and firearms from ravaged stores across the city. 
Gunfire was heard throughout the day” (Witt and Martinez, 2005).  The Washington Post 
reported, “Windows are smashed. Huge dudes muscle into an abandoned store and hustle 
out with stolen TV’s and boom boxes” (Weeks, 2005).                                                                
 To add even more fuel to the fire, articles not only described the looters lack of 
control and destructive behavior; reports also touched on the looters lack of respect for 
authority figures such as the police. Some looters were brave enough to steal items in 
plain view of National Guard troops (Martin, 2005). The Washington Post reported that 
even the U.S. Coast Guard was helpless against ill-behaved looters, “Hurricane Katri a
wiped out Coast Guard stations in Gulfport and Pascagoula, Miss., and looters wrecked 
part of its New Orleans base” (Barr, 2005).  The New York Times interviewed Col. Terry 
Ebbert, the chief of homeland security for the city, “We have a major looting problem. 
These are not individuals looting; these are large groups of armed individuals” (Treaster, 
2005).                                                                                                                                           
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Zero Tolerance for Ruthless Looters (Policing Frame)                                              
 According to numerous articles the behavior of looters within New Orleans ws 
so horrific that the only way to stop them was through aggressive policing and military 
action. To successfully combat looters the city New Orleans had to bring in additional 
police and troops. The New York Times reported, “Despair, privation and violent 
lawlessness grew so extreme in New Orleans by late Thursday that the city’s mayor 
issued a ‘desperate’ plea for help and other local officials, describing the security 
situation as horrific, lambasted the federal government as responding too slowly to the 
disaster…. ‘We need additional troops, food, water,’ said Joseph Matthews, director of 
the city’s Office of Emergency Preparedness. ‘We need personnel, law enforcement. This 
has turned into a situation where the city is being run by thugs’” (Treaster and Sontag, 
2005). Chicago Tribune reported, “The Defense Department sent 11,000 National Guard 
troops from at least eight states to help with law enforcement, communications and 
cleanup amid reports of widespread looting, marauding gangs and gunfire” (Witt and 
Martinez, 2005).                                                                                                                    
 Some police were even taken off search and rescue missions to help combat 
looting. The New York Times reported, “Things have spiraled so out of control that the 
city’s mayor ordered police officers to focus on looters and give up the search and rescue 
efforts” (Coates and Eggen, 2005 as cited in Tierney et. al., 2006: 67).  Additionally, 
Chicago Tribune reported that “Because New Orleans police were preoccupied with 
search and rescue missions, sheriff deputies and state police from around Louisiana 
began to patrol the city, some holding rifles as they rolled through the streets in armed 
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vehicles….but on Wednesday night the mayor ordered 1,500 city police, nearly the entire 
force, back to traditional roles” in order to combat looters (Witt and Martinez, 2005).                                                                                
 It was obvious that those in power, such as the New Orleans Mayor and 
Governor, exhibited a zero tolerance attitude toward anyone that looted and they were 
going to make it their duty to ensure drastic measures would be taken by local polie and 
military to stop looters. The Washington Post reported, “New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin 
said yesterday, ‘Once we get the 3,000 National Guardsmen here, we’re locking this 
place down’…. ‘I have instructed the Highway Patrol and National Guardsmen to treat 
looters ruthlessly. Looting will not be tolerated, period. And the rules of engagement will 
be as aggressive as the law allows’” (Weeks, 2005).  The New York Times reported, 
“Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, the governor, called people who committed such crimes
‘hoodlums’ and issued a warning to lawbreakers: Hundreds of National Guard troops 
hardened on the battlefield in Iraq had landed in New Orleans and had orders to shoot to 
kill. ‘They have M-16s, and they’re locked and loaded,’ she said. ‘These troops know 
how to shoot and kill, and they are more than willing to do so, and I expect they will 
(Treaster and Sontag, 2005)’”                                                                                                                          
The Elephant in the Room (Race Frame)                                                                                                          
 Last, but certainly not least was the issue of race. Michael Eric Dyson (2005) 
poses an interesting question, “How can race possibly be quarantined from a 
consideration of Katrina when it so thoroughly pervades our culture—the choices we 
make, the laws we adopt and discard, and the social practices that are polluted by its 
pestering ubiquity?” (19). The answer to this question, I presume, is that we can’t 
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quarantine race, especially in a disaster such as Katrina where 67 percent of th  
population were African American. But the issue of race, as told by the newspapers was 
not as prevalent as one may think. In fact, race was only extracted from one newspaper, 
The Washington Post, where it placed third; last place. However, because the issue of 
race is very much intertwined in our culture, especially within the Deep South, the issue 
could not be avoided. Dyson (2005) suggests white innocence and black guilt has been 
woven “into the fabric of cultural myths and racial narratives” (165). And is deeply 
embedded in society and affects every American institution, including the media (165). 
As a result, issues surrounding race in the Big Easy were sure to surface in media 
reporting.                                                                                                                                 
 Unlike the frames of property crime, lawlessness and policing, newspapers did 
not use race as a way to sell the looter as a “villain.” Instead, race was used as a way to 
acknowledge the “elephant in the room.” The Washington Post reported “First, to state 
the obvious: The people caught stealing on camera in that majority-black city weren’t 
doing it because they were black. Just as raiders of corporate treasuries don’t do it 
because they are white. Skin color has nothing to do with the urge to take what doesn’t 
belong to you. Poverty also isn’t the reason liquor gets stolen in a storm ravaged 
city….The looter on Canal Street in New Orleans and the corporate looter on Wall Street 
have a similar motive: greed. That is their taproot. And greed is no respecter of 
pigmentation, income, status or social class” (King, 2005).                                                      
 Instead of pointing the finger at the looters, newspapers opted to debunk the myth 
that many Americans were thinking; that blacks were responsible for the wide-spread 
 57
looting. This myth was established, in part, from the initial media coverage of Katrina’s 
aftermath. The newspapers wanted to offset the immediate hyperbolic language eared 
towards the New Orleans looter. The newspapers aim was to recover from the shame of 
how Katrina looters were portrayed by the media immediately after the storm. In the end, 
newspapers wanted to sweep away the mess of initial news reporting. And their way of 
dealing with the mess or embarrassment was to simply state the obvious: skin color had 
nothing to do with looted and who did not.                                                                 
 Further, when a primarily black population is put under the microscope in the 
United States the issue of race is sure to follow regardless of whether race has anything to 
do with the current situation or underlying problem. The newspapers’ approach to facing 
the race issue was simply to debunk the myths that looting was dominated by skin color. 
According to Bates and Swan (2007) many looters were not criminals engaged in 
breaking the law. They were people trying to survive a catastrophe in which normal 
means of obtaining necessities had been withdrawn and where government had failed to 
help people sustain life. In other words, most individuals who partook in looting after 
Katrina were driven to do so in order to survive not because of their race. The 
newspapers’ felt an overwhelming need to drive this point home; that race has no bearing 
on who loots and who does not.                                                                                                            
 In sum, looters were described by the media as uncontrollable and dangerous. 
They destroyed property and their behavior resembled that of war-like activities. Their 
behavior could only be detained by an excessive amount of police and troops. Articles 
reported that an additional 11,000 National Guard troops were called in from eight states 
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to help with law enforcement issues, the main culprit being that of looting. When it came 
to profiling looters the newspapers were careful not to step on any toes. Profiling was 
very rarely mentioned, but when it was, the newspapers were careful to avoid racial 
stereotyping. With over half of New Orleans’ population being African American the 
issue of race became the “elephant in the room.” It was something that had to be attend d 
to in a country where strong racial divides still exist. Instead of falling victim to racial 
stereotypes of looters, much like initial media reporting did, the three newspaper, The 
New York Times, The Washington Post and Chicago Tribune, worked to debunk the myth 
that looting was based on race. Their way of “dealing” with the issue of race was to state 
the obvious: skin color has nothing to do with who loots and who does not.                                                                               
 Now that the media’s narrative of the looter has been told, I can return to the 
unique moment in which the “villainous” looter as described above makes its first 
appearance; the special moment that allowed the main character to thrive.                            
When Looters Took Center Stage: A Unique Moment                                                     
 Disasters create a unique moment; the moment that directly follows the end of the 
disaster itself. In the case of New Orleans, this moment took place immediately after 
hurricane Katrina made its way out of the city and an awareness of the disorder t caused 
was recognized. It is the moment where society realizes that normal social order has been 
disturbed. It is this disorganization of order that I am interested in.                                       
 During this moment social stratification temporarily disappears. Survival takes 
center stage and all else fades. Black and whites, rich and poor are for a moment equal. 
“Us” and “them” are all of sudden dropped into the same playing field. Social order has 
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become so confused or non-existent that the social categories that were very much alive 
pre-disaster are for a moment voided for the sake of survival.                                                    
 What makes this moment unique is the opportunity it presents. It provides us with 
the chance to refocus inequality within society. It creates a moment in which things could 
change or be otherwise. For example, on September 15, 2005 President Bush addressed 
the nation on the recovery of New Orleans. Part of his speech focuses on this very notion 
of refocusing inequality and race relations in society:      
Our third commitment is this: When communities are rebuilt, they must be even 
better and stronger than before the storm. Within the gulf region are some of the 
most beautiful and historic places in America. As all of us saw on television, 
there's also some deep, persistent poverty in this region as well. That poverty has 
roots in a history of racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the 
opportunity of America. We have a duty to confront this poverty with bold action. 
So let us restore all that we have cherished from yesterday, and let us ris above 
the legacy of inequality. When the streets are rebuilt, there should be many new 
businesses, including minority-owned businesses, along those streets. When the 
houses are rebuilt, more families should own, not rent, those houses. When the 
regional economy revives, local people should be prepared for the jobs being 
created (CNN.com).                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                            
 In sum, disasters create a unique moment unlike any other. It creates a time and   
place where all bets are off. Everyone shares the same goal of survival and rebuilding. 
Thus, class and race issues subside and a unity bordering on nationalism emerges. For th  
time being, working together with your fellow American, no matter what his or her place 
in society was before, makes perfect sense. This moment offers a great deal of promise 
and creates the opportunity to change stratification that existed prior to the disast r. The 
human spirit and the welcoming of social change are at its highest. It is here where e 
see the looter first emerge. Where the presence of the looter is most anticipated and 
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where the looter complicates the storyline even further.                                                               
 The hospitable vision explained above does not persist for long. Somewhat 
ironically, it is the onset of civic and government relief itself that initiates a return to 
hierarchy and difference. To follow is a discussion of how the social construction of the 
“villainous” looter served as a means to end the invitation to change and begin the 
process of recovery which inevitably involves the recovery of an “us” vs. “them” social 
fabric. Recovery from disaster, as Brown-Jeffy and Kroll-Smith (2009) argue, by 
definition always includes the recovery of inequality. It is at this point of the story that 
we reach the climax or the height of conflict and struggle; where the idea of the l o er 
interrupts the romance of communitas and the urge to help thy neighbor.                                           
What the Role of the Looter Accomplished: Initiating Recovery and Reinvention of 
Inequality 
It is within this moment that the looting claims and rumors as described by the 
media are in full force. Bates and Ahmed (2007) argue that the way in which the media 
portrayed New Orleans within the first seventy-two hours following Katrina were 
problematic (cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 197). Images in the press gave the 
impression that those who stayed in New Orleans and looted were “out of control,” 
“wild,” “thugs,” and “criminals” (Agid, 2007 as cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 67). 
Shana Agid (2007) argues that these descriptions were mostly applied to the black 
population of New Orleans (cited in Bates and Swan, 2007: 67).                                                 
 It is within this moment that these looting rumors helped to reclaim the social 
order that was momentarily lost immediately after Katrina. The rumors of looting were a 
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way to make some sense of the chaos. It created a type of structure, something society 
could grasp to and understand.  These claims of looting were a way of establishing “us” 
vs. “them” once again. Looting claims re-emphasizes social categories and re-focused our 
way of thinking pre-disaster. In other words, social categories were re-established in an 
attempt to create some type of social order in a moment that was guided by utter chaos. It 
was the looter, or the claims made of, that provided the re-establishment of order after 
Katrina.                                                                                                                                        
 The story does not end here. It goes one step further to tie up some of the loose 
ends by asking the following questions; what did this re-claim of order suggest and why 
were looting claims of this nature such a powerful antidote in establishing social order 
again? I suggest there are two reasons for this: American materialism and the continuing 
legacy of racism. It is here that we come to the resolution of the story. Where I hop to 
bring clarity on why these claims of looting occurred. In other words, the following 
section serves as a way of unraveling the previous complexities of the story by providing 
a reason of why the rumors were so powerful.                                                                          
Why Claims of Looting Were Powerful: The Resolution 
A Functionalist Approach 
 The resolution of this story uses a functionalist view to explain why claims of 
looting where powerful in the re-establishment of order in New Orleans after Katrina. 
Specifically, the views of Emile Durkheim are identified. In relation to crime and deviant 
behavior, Durkheim believed that crime served an important function. He viewed 
deviance in society as normal and argued that society couldn’t and shouldn’t rid itself of 
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crime because it contributes to the heath of society. Crime is a necessary ingredie t for 
social change as it represents a positive manifestation of social cohesion. It makes people 
aware of the interests they have in common. Further, deviant behavior offends the 
conscience of everyone in the community, which fosters a tighter bond among 
community members.  Thus, crime offers society with an opportunity to draw a line or 
boundary between us (the good and moral) and them (the bad and corrupt). Durkheim’s 
theory can easily be applied to the unfolding of Katrina. In particular, what I wnt to 
emphasize from Durkheim’s theory is that crime can provide social cohesion or bonds 
among certain groups of people within society.  
Social Bonds and Boundaries 
  The deviant behavior of the looters served an important function in New 
Orleans. It is evident within the newspapers that the looters untamed and even dangerous 
behavior offended the conscience of many in the Crescent City. Newspapers revealed the 
community’s disgust or dislike of the looters behavior. This in turn, fostered a tighter 
bond among the “good” community members. The dislike for the looters created a sense
of social cohesion at a time when the city seemed to be spiraling out of control. It helped 
to re-establish “us” vs. “them.” In another way, the idea of the looter was used as a 
platform in which the re-building of social hierarchy or stratification could be re-built.  
Although the bond interrupted the “unique moment” in which things could be 
otherwise (where social stratification could be eliminated) it did promote a quick fix to 
the chaos. It was something that made sense when all else fell victim to disorder and 
confusion. Using the looter to pit the “good” citizens against the “bad” was readily 
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understood and provided some type of normalcy. Thus, from a Durkheimian perspective 
the looter proved to be functional because the idea of the looter as described by the 
newspapers was able to bring social cohesion (or a social bond) of the “haves” or the 
“good” members of the community. 
Next, these social bonds established social boundaries between the “haves” and 
“have-nots.”  And what this boundary is primarily based on is material culture. Or in 
another way, the boundary between these two groups reflect what the other has or does 
not have; a wealth of material goods. What the looter represents to the “haves” is th  fear 
of their “stuff” being taken away or threatened in some way by the “have-nots.” The next 
section reflects on this notion of materialism. 
American Materialism and the Legacy of Race 
 When looking back over history the “haves” for the most part have been made up 
of whites and the “have-nots” have been made up of blacks. What this suggests then is 
that from a historical standpoint whites have held the control and power of the 
distribution of material goods (Henricks, 2009). Many would agree, this distribution as 
not been exactly equal. This uneven distribution of material resources by race shapes the 
behavior of social structures such as the media and consequently arranges social 
hierarchy. That is, inequality orders society by racial rank order (Henricks, 2009). To 
demonstrate the contemporary racial hierarchy sociologist Charles Gallagher (2007) 
demonstrates an array of social disparities in the following areas: home ownership, 
poverty, accumulated wealth, earned income, white collar employment, unemployment, 
among others (Henricks, 2009).  Atop this racialized ladder stand white people. As racial 
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disparities indicate, the group position of being white translates into comparatively better 
living conditions and social standing in society. Therefore whites represent the 
privileged, and this position is accommodated by circumstances of social advantage 
(Henricks, 2009).  
Within Katrina this social advantage of whites is illustrated by two famous 
pictures that circulated many media venues; the picture of the white person “taking” 
goods from a grocery store while the black person “loots” food from a grocery store. The 
caption paired with the white residents claimed, “Two [white] residents wade through 
chest-deep water after finding bread and soda from a local grocery store after Hurricane 
Katrina came through the area in New Orleans...” While the caption paired with the black 
man claimed, “A young [black] man walks through chest deep floodwater after loo ing a 
grocery store in New Orleans...” These pictures and their captions can be viewed on the 
Infoshop News website: http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20050830195514688. 
By using Durkheim’s theory we are able to see or make sense of the racial 
boundary that exists in American society. And crimes, such as looting, or the very rumor 
of it, were a way of re-establishing that boundary after Hurricane Katrina. The boundary 
is not just the establishment of the “haves” vs. the “have-nots” it also serves as a 
reminder of how much value we put on material culture. The looter, then, in its unique 
way, as Durkheim would argue, was a necessary ingredient in re-building social stru ture 
in New Orleans. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Returning to the work of Picou and Marshall (2007) found within the literature 
review, Katrina calls for a shift in the conceptualization of disasters. As I approach the 
end of this research I concur with their affirmation.  Katrina opened the eyes of 
sociologists of all backgrounds (Picou and Marshall, 2007). Sociologists interested in 
social stratification and race relations found issues of inequality and racism publicly 
visible in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Social psychologists observed personal and 
collective trauma. Criminologists turned their attention to criminal activity such as 
looting, and the list goes on and on (Picou and Marshall, 2007).  No matter what your 
sociological interest, the wake of Katrina was sure to draw your attention. Picou and 
Marshall (2007) state it best, “Katrina reawakened the sociological imagination for many 
and provided an enlightenment signal that reintroduced the need for understanding 
modern risks and promoting a more public sociology that is relevant to the social 
challenges that will confront society in the twenty-first century” (18).   
The research presented here provides an initial step in this direction by addressing 
how one of the most prominent media outlets (newspapers) in the United States framed 
the perceived problem of looting after the storm ravaged New Orleans. Furthermore, with 
the occurrence of two major disasters (the earthquake in Haiti on January 12 and Chile on 
 66
February 27) already in 2010, where reports of wide-spread looting have again surfced, 
looting does prove to be a problem worth investigating in the twenty-first century. 
I started this project with a brief description of the imagery of Katrina’s aftermath 
put forth by the news media. In particular, I painted a picture of how the media portryed 
the New Orleans looter. This picture portrayed individuals trapped in New Orleans as  
threat to society rather than survivors in need of help. As exemplified in the literature 
review, Tierney, Bevc and Kuligowski (2006) maintain that initial reports charaterized 
victims as opportunistic looters and violent criminals. However, sociological resea ch is 
limited in terms of examining looting, especially in the wake of a disaster. Th  current 
investigation was an attempt to help lessen the void within the literature by exploring 
how the looter was socially constructed by the media after Hurricane Katrina.  
Based on a frame analysis of the The New York Times, The Washington Post and 
Chicago Tribune, four primary looting frames emerged from the current work: property 
crime, lawlessness, policing, and race. The extracted looting frames provide insight into 
how the media portrayed those who looted after Hurricane Katrina. The unfolding of the 
analysis told a unique sociological story by bringing the New Orleans lootert  life.  
The underlying idea of the looter after Katrina took on an ill-famed or villainous 
tone. According to media reports, looters vandalized, ran wild among the city and 
required “tough policing” in order to contain their behavior. It was the media that served 
as a social force that helped create and move these ideas about looting.  
The portrayal of the looter in this light becomes of great importance in the 
moment after a disaster takes place: the moment in which society realizes that utter chaos 
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has replaced the normal social order. It is at this time when people pull together and set 
aside their differences. However, this warm and fuzzy feeling of wanting to pull together 
as one does not sustain itself for long. After Katrina, it was the claims of looting that 
broke this romanticized feeling of social justice for all. Looting rumors at this time 
contribute to the re-establishment of social order or in another way, bring back old 
societal order. This is accomplished because looters are a way of establishing us (the 
good guys) and them (the bad guys) once again in a time in which all social order is for a 
moment lost. In other words, singling out the looter becomes a way to make sense of the 
chaos; brings back stratification; brings back something that is familiar and m ybe even 
comforting to those that hold more power in society. Claims of looting were powerful in 
this way because it was based on the age old struggle between the “haves” and “have-
nots.”  
Study Limitations 
 This study possesses a few limitations. First, the frame analysis used a sample 
focusing on only the two weeks following Hurricane Katrina. An analysis that explors a 
different time period or a longer time period may produce different results. Second, the 
frame analysis only accounted for The New York Times, The Washington Post and 
Chicago Tribune, which limits its usefulness in generalizing beyond these three 
newspapers. Third, newspaper accounts written on disasters are one of the most 
accessible documentary sources but often the least valid. Because of the many 
uncontrolled bias of reporters and editors, particularly their tendency to overemphasize 
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the dramatic, newspapers stories must be used with caution (Killian, 1956 as cited in 
Stallings, 2002: 81).
Future Research Directions 
The phenomenon of looting is rare and has yet to be examined with much detail. 
This is even more so the case after disasters. Based on the current examination, con nued 
inquiry into looting after disasters in our society is warranted. Further res a ch could 
expand upon the current work by conducting a comparative study of Hurricane Katrina 
with recent disasters such as the earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010 and/or in Chile 
on February 27, 2010. Just as we saw in Katrina, reports of looting after each earthquake 
surfaced almost immediately. These disasters offer us real time looting opportunities to 
explore. A comparative study such as this would help the research community and 
society as a whole better understand looting during and after disasters in recent time.
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